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A. INTRODUCTION
It is increasingly being recognised that broad tags such as “humanism” and 
“scholasticism” fail to do justice to the “hybrid” nature of legal as well as 
theological sources of the early modern period, certainly in the Iberian 
world.1 A case in point are the Commentarii ad rubricam et legem 2, C. de 
rescindenda venditione by the Portuguese jurist Arias Piñel, a successful 
legal practitioner born in Sesimbra who combined his lawyering activities 
with a position at the University of Coimbra and later at Salamanca. By 
submitting C.4.44.2 to thorough philological and historical analysis, Piñel 
 1 This contribution draws on material previously published in W Decock, Theologians and  contract 
law, The moral transformation of the ius commune (c. 1500–1650) (2013) 566–589.
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wanted to investigate the “true” meaning of laesio enormis. Against the gloss 
and the communis opinio doctorum, he claimed that the remedy by virtue 
of C.4.44.2 was unknown to the Roman jurists before the time of Emperors 
Diocletian and Maximian. In Piñel’s view, the irrelevance of lesion to pristine 
Roman law was obvious from a careful exegesis of various texts in the Digest. 
Although he expressed the fear that many scholars would bear the “new light 
of truth” on laesio enormis badly, Piñel went further in his critique of tra-
ditional legal scholarship by revealing the medieval origins of the allegedly 
Roman doctrine of objective deceit (dolus reipsa) –  which was tradition-
ally associated with the teachings on lesion. The mission of the jurist from 
Sesimbra was to combat anachronistic readings of the Roman sources. He 
believed that the French humanists did not go far enough in their exercise 
of contextualising the Roman legal tradition. Piñel wanted to highlight the 
fundamental difference between the pagan legal culture that had informed 
the classical Roman jurists, on the one hand, and the new mentality of the 
ius commune as it developed during the Christian Middle Ages, on the 
other. Having said that, his thinking remained heavily imbued with Christian 
values. For his defence of justice in exchange he drew heavily on the scho-
lastic theologians. Moreover, his style of writing sometimes recalls that of 
the Spanish canonist and theologian Martin de Azpilcueta, one of his former 
teachers. Eventually, Piñel became an authority himself for “elegant scholas-
tic humanists” such as the Spanish canonist Diego de Covarruvias y Leyva.
B. THE CAREER AND CONVICTIONS OF  
A HUMANIST JURIST2
(1) Combining erudition with practical engagement
In the 1582 edition of the Corpus iuris canonici, commissioned by Pope 
Gregory XIII, the correctores Romani refer to Arias Piñel for further discus-
sion on laesio enormis.3 Arias Piñel (1515–1563) was a humanist jurist from 
Sesimbra near Lisbon. He ranks among those exceptional Renaissance men 
who continue to appeal to the modern reader both through depth of knowl-
 2 For Piñel’s biography this article relies on the excellent monograph written by J García Sánchez, 
Arias Piñel, Catedrático de Leyes en Coimbra y Salamanca durante el siglo XVI, La rescisión 
de la compraventa por “laesio enormis” (2004) 39–143, reviewed by T Wallinga in (2006) 74 
Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 185–187.
 3 Cf nota Vide l.2 ad X 3,17,3 (canon Quum dilecti) in Corpus Iuris Canonici (1582) part 2, col 
1123.
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edge and liveliness of personality. Piñel appears to have been a successful 
jurist in his own day. A popular law professor, first at Coimbra (1539–1548 
/1556–1559) and later at Salamanca (1559–1563), Piñel alternated legal 
scholarship with prestigious lawyering activities, serving, for example, as an 
advocate at the Casa de Suplicación in Lisbon. 
In light of his own career, it should not come as a surprise that Piñel 
cites the famous statement that “law schools have the laws shoved down 
your throat, while the courts make you digest them, since practice is the 
science of digestion”. This expression can be traced back at least to Baldus 
de Ubaldis (1327–1400),4 but it became particularly popular in the early 
modern period. For example, Joost De Damhouder (1507–1581), one of the 
Low Countries’ most influential jurists ever, rebuked those young ambitious 
lawyers who pleaded before the Council of Flanders or the Great Council 
of Malines without any knowledge about how those courts worked in prac-
tice.5 In Piñel’s own experience, lawyering without a solid theoretical basis is 
dangerous, but legal scholarship without practical application is ineffective.6 
From classical literature he claims further proof for this insight, citing Pliny 
the Elder’s words that “the real battle takes place on the forum, the school is 
but a harmless kind of thing”. 
However, if the tremendous erudition displayed by Piñel is anything to go 
by, for instance in his very praise of legal practice, then we must conclude 
from this that the humanist ideal which he ultimately aspired to in his life 
can hardly be attained without some degree of academic learning. In this 
regard, Piñel’s way of thinking is reminiscent of that of the famous Spanish 
canonist Diego de Covarruvias y Leyva (1512–1577). Covarruvias, too, com-
bined a remarkable passion for humanist learning with a high sensitivity 
 4 Baldus, In primam Digesti veteris partem commentaria, ad D.4.4.38, f 256v, num 35: “Leges in 
scholis diglutiuntur, in palaciis digeruntur, quia practica est scientia digestiva.”
 5 J de Damhouder, Praxis rerum civilium (1567) cap 96, 182, nr 2: “Nam quamvis saepenumero 
tales iuvenes sint docti et iurisprudentia plurimum valeant, stylum tamen fori, experientiam, et 
praxim nondum sunt consecuti, ac procedendi modum non satis tenent, quem quotidiana obser-
vatione et usu paulatim tandem assequuntur.” On Damhouder, see R Feenstra, “Damhouder”, 
in M Stolleis (ed), Juristen, Ein biographisches Lexikon, Von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert 
(1995) 152–153. For his seminal contributions to criminal law, see J Monballyu, “La théorie sur 
la sorcellerie chez Wielant et Damhouder”, in F Stevens and D van den Auweele (eds), Houd 
voet bij stuk, Xenia iuris historiae G Van Dievoet oblata (1990) 291. 
 6 A Piñel, Commentarii ad rub. et l. 2, C. de rescindenda venditione, cum annotationibus 
Emanuelis Soarez a Ribiera. Accessit eiusdem argumenti cap. 3 et 4, lib. 2 resolutionum Didaci 
Covarruviae (1618), ad l 2, part 2, cap 4, num 2, 152: “Ego autem post longam legendi professio-
nem, postque diligentissimam foro navatam operam, in ea sententia sum, ut theorica sine praxi 
digestam solidamque iuris cognitionem praestare nequeat, praxisque absque theorica maxime 
periculosa et manca evadat.” 
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for legal practice. His learned and often highly sophisticated commentaries 
on the ius commune were interspersed with quite personal reflections on 
legal practice, passionate notes on textual criticism and brilliant quotes from 
ancient literary sources. 
It is this combination of a passion for learning with a remarkable record 
of practical experience –  a combination that is typical of many so-called 
“humanist jurists” –  that we are going to discover as we analyse Piñel’s 
commentary on the lex secunda, that is the second provision of title 44 (De 
rescindenda venditione, on rescission of sale contracts) of the fourth book 
of the Code. C.4.44.2 famously states that if you or your father have sold a 
piece of land for a price considerably below its value, it is only human that 
you either repay the price and get back your land, or that you receive the 
surplus value, depending on the will of the buyer.7 
Piñel insists on the necessity of examining the historical and philosophical 
roots from which the famous Lex secunda originated before trying to explain 
its true meaning. “The arts, like trees, cannot reach high if they are cut off 
from their roots.”8 In the footsteps of Marcus Tullius Cicero, Piñel was con-
vinced that humanist erudition and a true sense of historical criticism were 
not just qualities that boost the reputation of a lawyer. They were crucial to 
the fruitful interpretation of the sacred texts of law in a continuously chang-
ing context.9 A full exploration of Piñel’s exposition lies beyond the scope of 
this chapter.10 Yet it is worthwhile dwelling for a moment on the following 
points: his praise of private property and the prohibition against harming 
fellow human beings. 
(2) Praise of the individual against political absolutism
Piñel starts out with a seemingly theoretical investigation on the origin of the 
sale-purchase contract. It leads him into vast discussions with the Bartolists 
and the French humanists on subjects that seem to be rather exotic at first 
 7 For further explanation and literature on the subject, please allow me to refer to Decock, 
Theologians and contract law (n 1) 529–535.
 8 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad rubr, part 1, cap 1, 1–2pr: “Artium enim, sicut arborum, altitudo 
sine radicibus esse non potest, iuxta Ciceronis sententiam.” The original expression is slightly 
different, cf Cicero, Orator, 43, 147, in: Cicéron, L’orateur, Du meilleur genre d’orateurs, Texte 
établi et traduit par Albert Yon [Collection des Universités de France] (1964) 53: “Nam omnium 
magnarum artium sicut arborum altitudo nos delectat, radices stirpesque non item; sed esse illa 
sine his non potest.”
 9 See Piñel, Commentarii (n 6) 1–65 (65 is wrongly indicated as 63 in the Antwerp 1618 edition).
10 For a more extensive overview of the contents of Piñel’s commentary on both the rubrica and the 
Lex secunda, see García Sánchez, Arias Piñel (n 2) 201–234.
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sight, such as the existence or not of money in the time of the Trojan War. 
He concludes –  in line with traditional teaching –  that emptio venditio falls 
under the ius gentium. Yet, importantly, Piñel explains why jurists through-
out the ages have considered this to be a question worthy of so much 
debate:11 “they say that this investigation is useful, because the prince can 
abolish more easily what falls under the ius civile than what falls under ius 
naturale, that is the ius gentium”.12 Piñel tries to argue, in this respect, that 
ius gentium and ius naturale are synonyms.13 He cites the Lutheran jurist 
Johann Oldendorp (c1487–1567) to bolster this opinion, although this refer-
ence is probably a little bit dishonest, since Oldendorp was anxious to stress 
the differences between ius gentium and ius naturale.14 If any, the theoreti-
cal difference between natural law and the law of nations resides in the fact 
that natural law is shared by animals and human beings alike (D.1.1.1–3). So, 
properly speaking, ius gentium and ius naturale are only equivalents if ius 
naturale is understood as the ius naturale that is proper to the human race.
In any event, Piñel eventually maintains that these distinctions between 
different types of law are actually superfluous, since all kinds of ius must be 
protected against interference by the prince. Piñel goes to great lengths to 
combat political absolutism (absoluta potestas). In his view, the first kind of 
harm (laesio) that can be done to the citizens is the infringement of their 
rights by the prince. Moreover, Piñel holds that the prince not only has no 
right to violate rights that are derived from the ius gentium. The prince 
should in fact never be allowed to violate any transfer of property between 
citizens, even if their agreement fell under the ius civile.15 Consequently, the 
traditional distinction between rights deriving from ius gentium and rights 
based on ius civile is largely superseded, Piñel claims. 
Mainstream political thought, which defends absolute power, is to be 
11 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad rubr, part 1, cap 1, num 31, 9: “Dicunt enim esse utilem eam 
inspectionem, quia princeps facilius tollere potest, quae sunt iuris civilis, quam ea, quae sunt 
iuris naturalis vel gentium.”
12 For further explanation, see K Pennington, The prince and the law (1200–1600), Sovereignty 
and rights in the Western legal tradition (1993).
13 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad rubr, part 1, cap 1, num 18–19, 6.
14 J Oldendorp, Variae lectiones ad iuris civilis interpretationem (1546) 16: “Quare cum audis hanc 
vocem, Ius gentium, non semper exaudiendum est Ius naturale, sed plerumque Ius humanum, 
ut Livius recte appellat. Neque enim sequitur: Gentes id constituerunt, aut in usum admiserunt: 
Ergo est ius naturale aut aequum. Imo, saepe iniquissimum est.”
15 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6) ad rubr, part 1, cap 2, num 1, 10: “Demus enim aliquid acquisitum iure 
civili, prout ex stipulatione vel alia conventione vel obligatione ex iis quas scribentes dicunt esse 
iuris civilis, per d. l. ex hoc iure. Certe nulla ratio est, cur princeps auferre possit dominium vel 
ius quaesitum ex tali conventione iuris civilis, quia in eo laederetur simul lex et ratio naturalis et 
ius gentium, ut inferius cum Cicerone probabimus.”
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exterminated, according to Piñel, because it is inhumane (inhumana).16 In 
the meantime, princes should be urged to respect private rights as faithfully 
as possible. They have only limited power. This is the truth that Piñel finds 
it necessary to investigate and to explain even if the prince has no superior 
in his territory. Moreover, he thinks that private individuals have a means of 
effectively protecting their property against usurpation by the prince –  at 
least if the regime has not turned into a tyranny.
(3) The social nature of man and the do-no-harm principle
The basis of Piñel’s diatribe against political absolutism and interference 
with private property lies in his conception of justice as a kind of do-no-
harm principle. This is a principle dictated by natural reason. It is expressed 
in the legal, the religious, and the philosophical traditions from Classical 
Antiquity:17 “Depriving someone of his property or right (dominium vel ius 
suum) clearly is an offence not only against the civil or man-made written 
law, but also against natural law or the law of nations, and even against the 
law of God, since harm (iniuria) and injustice (iniustitia) are inconsistent 
with each of these bodies of law.”
Obviously, Ulpian’s definition of justice in D.1.1.1pr fits well into Piñel’s 
conception of justice. In Roman-law terms, justice is the constant and per-
petual will to give everybody his right, to do no harm (neminem laedere), 
and to live honestly.18 Following late medieval jurists such as Baldus and 
humanists such as François Connan and Guillaume Budé, Piñel repeats that 
natural reason (ratio naturalis) itself dictates that we may do no harm to our 
neighbours. The text from D.1.1.3 is a positive legal expression of that natu-
ral truth. It says that it is nefarious for man to do harm to another man, since 
nature made us into “relatives” of one another. 
In principle, Roman law also contains a prohibition on unjust enrich-
ment. Piñel grants that the prohibition contained in D.12.6.14pr (ne quis 
cum aliena iactura locupletetur) can be seen as an expression of natural 
reason (ratio naturalis). However, true to the humanist spirit, he denies 
16 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad rubr, part 1, cap 2, num 24, 18: “Infertur tandem omnino reijcien-
dam et exterminandam esse inhumanam illam multorum traditionem, cum principi tribuunt 
plenissimam vel absolutam potestatem, eam ab ordinaria distinguentes, ut ex illa omnia possit, 
utque facta mentione talis potestatis nulla exceptio obijci valeat.”
17 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad rubr, part 1, cap 2, num 26, 20: “. . . satis liquere videtur . . . cum 
alicui dominium vel ius suum aufertur, non tantum ius civile, vel humanum scriptum offendi, sed 
etiam naturale et gentium, imo et divinum, quibus repugnat iniuria vel iniustitia.”
18 D.1.1.1pr-3.
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that the Roman jurists themselves could have meant this to be an expres-
sion of the Judaeo-Christian prohibition on stealing. To be sure, parallels 
between Roman law and Christian theology in regard to the principle of 
unjust enrichment do exist. After all, both normative systems have been 
inspired by natural reason. Yet Piñel rejects the idea that Roman jurispru-
dence was influenced directly by divine law.19
To Piñel himself, divine law does matter, of course. Laesio inflicted by an 
absolutist prince or by another citizen goes against the Seventh Commandment 
not to steal. In reality, Piñel does not cite the Seventh Commandment. He 
merely refers to ius divinum in general. The only Scriptural passages he 
quotes are the so-called Golden Rule: “Do to others, what you would have 
them do to you, that is the entire Law and Prophets” (Mt 7:12), and the 
precept to love your neighbour as yourself (Mt 22:37–39). These prescripts 
would have been part of Catholic culture in general. Unlike his Protestant 
counterparts, Piñel would not have felt the need to get involved in profound 
Biblical exegesis. In fact, he claims that he borrowed the references to these 
New Testament texts from Augustine’s City of God.20
Contrary to the meagre attention paid to divine law, Piñel is eager to 
adduce as many authoritative texts as possible from Greek and Roman phi-
losophers to support his views on justice. Aristotle’s argument against tyr-
anny serves as a warning that the more power is concentrated in the hands 
of the rulers, the more likely it is that political stability will be short-lived, 
since oligarchy and tyranny are the most unstable forms of government.21 
Through Ambrose he quotes the typically Stoic maxim that man is born not 
only with the aim of becoming useful to himself, but also to others (homo 
non ut sibi ipsi tantum sed et ut aliis prosit natus).22 To wrong other people 
19 For example, he criticises the ordinary Gloss on D.47.2 (De furtis) for interpreting natural law 
as “divine law” in the Roman text which reads that theft is prohibited as a matter of natural 
law. According to Piñel, “that interpretation is miles away from the mind of Paul the jurist; in 
writing this, Paul did not know about the precepts of divine law and sacred Scripture”; cf Piñel, 
Commentarii (n 6), ad rubr, part 1, cap 1, num 21, 7: “Patet errasse glossa in d. l. 1 dum exponit 
lege naturali, id est, divina. Id enim prorsus a mente iurisconsulti Pauli ibi, qui praecepta divinae 
legis et sacrae scripturae non cognovit.”
20 Piñel undoubtedly refers to Augustinus, De civitate Dei (Ed. CCSL 48) (1955), 19, 14, p 681: 
“Iam vero quia duo praecipua praecepta, hoc est dilectionem Dei et dilectionem proximi, docet 
magister Deus, in quibus tria invenit homo quae diligat, Deum, se ipsum et proximum . . .”
21 Aristotle, Politica (5th edn, W D Ross) (1957), 5, 12, 1315b11–12, p 187: “καίτοι πασῶν 
ὀλιγοχρονιώταται τῶν πολιτειῶν εἰσιν ὀλιγαρχία καὶ τυραννίς”.
22 This appears to be a free adaptation of Ambrose, De officiis, 1, 28, 132, in Saint Ambroise, Les 
devoirs, Livre 1, Texte établi, traduit et annoté par Maurice Testard [Collection des Universités 
de France] (1984) vol 1, 158: “Quo in loco aiunt placuisse stoicis quae in terris gignantur, omnia 
ad usus hominum creari; homines autem hominum causa esse generatos ut ipsi inter se aliis alii 
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is to violate nature (naturam violat, qui alteri nocet).23
As is commonly known, patristic social thought, particularly as expressed 
in Ambrose’s On duties, is to a very large extent modelled on Cicero’s On 
duties. It is hardly surprising, then, to find that Piñel borrows the greatest 
part of his social views from the famous Roman orator. Accordingly, Piñel 
regards as one of the most important principles for living in society the 
universal prohibition on harming another person out of self-interest (non 
liceat sui commodi causa nocere alteri).24 The do-no-harm principle pertains 
to natural law. It imposes itself upon all human beings, princes and Popes 
included. It can be regarded as the basis of the laesio-interdiction in contrac-
tual exchange, in particular. 
C. UNHOLY NEW IDEAS:  
PIÑEL’S CRITICAL INTERPRETATION OF LAESIO ENORMIS 
(1) The concept of laesio enormis is not part of classical Roman law
For the majority of the late medieval jurists, the beginning of Piñel’s com-
mentary on the Lex secunda would have been shocking.25
Against the gloss and the opinion of all previous writers I strongly believe that the 
right grounded on C.4.44.2 was issued for the first time only (nove) by Emperors 
Diocletian and Maximian. Consequently, this remedy was entirely unknown by 
the jurists (whose responsa we find in the Digest). May the true sense of many 
laws be revealed through this insight.
Centuries of reading Roman law in light of Christian principles, or, better 
still, of doing legal scholarship in search of Roman legal texts giving author-
itative support to Christian principles are suddenly being thought of as 
prodesse possint.”
23 An allusion to Ambrose, De officiis (edn Testard), 3, 4, 24, in Saint Ambroise, Les devoirs, Livres 
2–3, Texte établi, traduit et annoté par Maurice Testard [Collection des Universités de France] 
(1992) vol 2, 91: “Hinc ergo colligitur quod homo qui secundum naturae formatus est directio-
nem, ut oboediat sibi, nocere non possit alteri; quod, si qui nocet, naturam violet . . . ”
24 E.g. Cicero, De officiis, 3, 5, 21 (edn Testard, vol 2) 81: “Detrahere igitur alteri aliquid et homi-
nem hominis incommodo suum commodum augere magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam 
paupertas, quam dolor, quam cetera quae possunt aut corpori accidere aut rebus externis.”
25 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad l 2, part 1, cap 1, num 3, 66–67: “Ego contra glossam et omnes 
hucusque scribentes verissimum credo, Diocletianum et Maximianum imperatores, nove hoc ius 
[C.4.44.2] induxisse, ac proinde iurisconsultis (quorum responsa in libris digestorum habemus) 
nullatenus hoc remedium cognitum fuisse.” Compare his conclusion in lc, num 7, 68: “Nemo 
igitur iuris vel rationis peritus inauditam nostram sententiam reijciendam putabit, cum tot iuri-
bus, totque fundamentis probetur, ut sic contra glossam et omnes hucusque scribentes maneat, 
ex constitutione hac Diocletiani novum ius inductum fuisse . . . ”
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superseded. Highly indebted to the mentality of Renaissance humanism, 
Piñel looks for nothing but the true meaning (verus sensus) of the Roman 
texts. He wants to understand them in their original context. He wants to 
highlight the fundamental difference between the pagan worldview of the 
classical jurists and the Christian ius commune as it developed in the later 
Middle Ages.
The classical jurists ignored the remedy now associated with C.4.44.2. 
This is what Piñel infers from the absence of even the slightest reference in 
other imperial constitutions and in the Digest to this remedy or to a concrete 
determination of the quantity that constitutes laesio. If the remedy for lesion 
had been as crucially important to the pre-Diocletian Romans as it was to 
the late medieval jurists, then we could have expected a more elaborate 
treatment of it in the Corpus Justinianeum, according to Piñel. 
Moreover, he interprets D.4.4.16.4 (in pretio emptionis et venditionis 
naturaliter licet contrahentibus se circumvenire) as originally constituting 
a kind of absolute principle of “freedom of contract”:26 “These words do 
not admit of imaginary afterthoughts and external restrictions by doctors 
who seek to limit them by virtue of C.4.44.2.” The same holds true for 
D.19.2.22.3 (in locationibus quoque licet invicem se circumscribere)27: “If 
we love the truth, we cannot interpret these words as admitting of the 
 violent limitations imposed by the doctors.”
In Piñel’s view, the irrelevance of lesion to original Roman law is obvious 
from various texts in the Digest. First of all, lesion is not listed as a ground 
for rescission in De rescindenda venditione (D.18.5). Secondly, in obvious 
cases of lesion the Roman jurists did not provide the laesus with a remedy 
(e.g. D.42.1.15). Thirdly, in his On duties, Cicero recounts the story of a sly 
and wicked vendor called Pythius who tricked Canius.28 He sold him sterile 
and absolutely worthless lands by persuading him that these lands were in 
fact the most fruitful lands. Now Cicero apparently did not think Canius 
could have had any other remedy to defend himself except for the actio de 
dolo, even though this was a clear instance of lesion beyond moiety.
26 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad l 2, part 1, cap 1, num 4, 67: “Quae verba non admittunt commen-
ticias subauditiones, extrariasque restrictiones doctorum ea limitantium ex decisione huius l.”
27 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad l 2, part 1, cap 1, num 4, 67: “Quae verba (si verum amamus) non 
admittunt violentam doctorum limitationem.”
28 Cicero, De officiis (edn Testard, vol 2), 3, 14, 58–60, 100–102.
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(2) The concept of dolus reipsa is a late medieval invention
Cicero’s story of Pythius and Canius leads Piñel to deconstruct yet another 
mythical notion that was fabricated in the ius commune on the basis of 
D.45.1.36pr: objective deceit (dolus re ipsa). Piñel recognises that he is 
afraid (vereor) that many will badly bear the new light of truth (novam 
veritatis lucem) he is about to shed on the matter, blinded as they are by an 
inveterate misinterpretation.29 Yet there is no denying a certain feeling of 
pride and superiority in his voice as he announces his new exegesis. Perhaps 
this might explain why his pupil, Manuel Soarez a Ribeira, felt the need to 
soften the impious impression his master left. He inserted a gloss on vereor 
in what became the standard edition of Piñel’s book. In this gloss, he quoted 
a couple of verses from Horace’s Letters, expressing the idea that the elderly 
do not accept criticism against well-known playwrights, either because they 
think that the right thing is only what pleases them, or because they do 
not want to admit that what they learned as young boys was false.30 In this 
manner, Soarez a Ribeira tries to make clear why Piñel had a legitimate 
reason to be afraid: people tend to be wary of what is new, because innova-
tion is often detrimental to society.
The upshot of Piñel’s argument is that the classical jurists were not con-
cerned with laesio, whether big or small, as long as it was not accompanied 
by dolus. In the absence of deceit, they would not consider any deviation 
from some sort of normal price to be relevant. They had no conception of 
deceit as something intrinsic to the transaction itself. Only in cases of inten-
tional deceit (interveniente dolo) could the quantity of the lesion become 
relevant. The idea of objective deceit could not possibly have made sense to 
the classical jurists, since the remedy provided in C.4.44.2 had not yet come 
into existence.31 This is a good example of how important the insight of the 
novelty of the Lex secunda is for a correct understanding of the Digest.
The locus classicus of the debate on objective deceit was the lex: Si 
29 Piñel, Commentarii, ad l 2, part 1, cap 1, num 7, 68: “Vereor tamen ne ex tenebris inveterati 
erroris plures fortasse novam veritatis lucem aegre sustineant.”
30 Horace, Epistulae, 2, 1, 79–85, in Horace, Satires, Epistles, and Ars poetica, with an English 
translation by H Rushton Fairclough, [Loeb Classical Library, 194], Cambridge Mass /London, 
pp 402–404: “Attae fabula si dubitem, clament periisse pudorem cuncti pene patres, ea cum 
reprehedere coner; quae gravis Aesopus, quae doctus Roscius egit, vel quia nil rectum, nisi quod 
placuit sibi, dicunt, vel quia turpe putant parere minoribus, et quae imberbes didicere, senes 
perdenda fateri.”
31 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad l 2, part 1, cap 1, num 7, 68: “Inde etiam eleganter colligitur, cur 
tantum interveniente dolo iurisconsulti distinxerunt circa quantitatem . . . quasi cessante dolo 
non esset differentia inter magnam vel parvam laesionem.”
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quis cum aliter (D.45.1.36). In the medieval ius commune it was inter-
preted as containing a distinction between two types of deceit: deceit by 
tricks (dolus ex machinatione) and objective deceit (dolus reipsa).32 Lesion 
beyond moiety was then deemed to be a species of dolus reipsa. However, 
Piñel reads the lex: si quis cum aliter in a completely different way. He 
does not deny that the text is subdivided into two parts that deal with two 
different types of deceit. Yet sensitive to the procedural nature of Roman 
law, he differentiates between deceit at the moment of the conclusion of 
the contract and deceit that only emerges when the contract becomes the 
subject of a lawsuit:33
The true sense of D.45.1.36 is that both parts of it deal with a plaintiff who 
committed deceit. The first part concerns deceit right from the inception of the 
agreement (a principio conventionis). The second part concerns deceit at the 
moment of the lawsuit (tempore iudicii). For that reason, the defendant is equally 
granted an exceptio doli against the deceitful plaintiff in both cases.
Departing from a metaphysical reading of the Latin word “res”, Piñel 
rightly gives a much more practically significant meaning to it: “lawsuit”. The 
sentence that was traditionally seen as the foundation of “objective deceit” 
then simply reads as follows: “the lawsuit itself is affected by deceit” (ipsa res 
in se dolum habet). This new interpretation is illustrated through the follow-
ing example. Assume that something has been promised or agreed upon in 
view of a certain reason (causa), but that, subsequently, this reason does not 
come about. There was no deceit at the moment of concluding the contract. 
Still, the very act of taking the promisor to court would then be deceitful, 
since the reason that drove the promisor into the contract had not been 
 realised (causa non secuta).34
32 D.45.1.36: “Si quis, cum aliter eum convenisset obligari, aliter per machinationem obligatus 
est, erit quidem subtilitati iuris obstrictus, sed doli exceptione uti potest; quia enim per dolum 
obligatus est, competit ei exceptio. Idem est, et si nullus dolus intercessit stipulantis, sed ipsa res 
in se dolum habet; cum enim quis petat ex ea stipulatione, hoc ipso dolo facit, quod petit.”
33 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad l 2, part 1, cap 1, num 8, 68: “Verus ergo sensus d.l. est, quod in 
utraque parte eius parte, agens dolo erat: in prima vero, fuerat dolus a principio conventionis, in 
secunda tempore iudicii. Ideoque pariter doli exceptio adversus agentem datur.”
34 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad l 2, part 1, cap 1, num 8, 68–69: “Exemplum autem secundae partis 
facile colligitur ex l. 1, ff. de condictione sine causa [D.12.7.1], melius vero ex l. 2, § circa, ff. 
de doli exceptione [D.44.4.2.3], prout quando aliquid promissum vel conventum fuit ob certam 
causam postea deficientem. Tunc enim in contractu nulla fraus intervenit. Dolose autem ex eo 
ageretur, causa non secuta.”
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(3) Imitating and emulating the French humanists
Arias Piñel does not hide the contempt he feels for the communis opinio. 
He deplores that even recent French humanist authors such as Pierre Loriot 
and Pierre Coustau (Costalius) made the mistake of reading the lex: si quis 
cum aliter and the lex: secunda together.35 Because they did not properly 
investigate the historical development of C.4.44.2, they ignored the fact that 
Emperors Diocletian and Maximian created a new remedy, which was non-
existent in classical jurisprudential literature. Therefore, they also made a 
futile effort reading laesio enormis into D.45.1.36. 
As critical as a humanist jurist can be, Piñel concludes that traditional 
authority failed (hallucinati sunt).36 Originally, Roman law did not care about 
lesion or some kind of “objective deceit”. Only if a case of unequal exchange 
also involved duress or fraud did the classical jurists grant a remedy. Against 
this background, Piñel feels disappointed by Charles Du Moulin’s harsh 
assessment of C.4.44.2. How could such a learned man berate Diocletian 
and Maximian so severely for not giving relief to a lesioned party unless 
the lesion was beyond moiety?37 In Piñel’s view, it is to the credit of the 
35 P Coustau, Adversaria ex Pandectis Iustiniani (1554), part 1, ad D.4.4.16, 79: “Et ex par. Idem 
Pomponius vulgo omnibus in ore est, et iure civili, et pontificio permissum esse contrahentibus se 
invicem decipere, quod tamen a bono viro alienum est. Plane si deceptio ex dolo veniat, de dolo 
actio erit, et contractus rescindetur. Idem si dolus in reipsa est, nempe quia deceptio ultra dimidiam 
iusti pretii intercessit, tunc enim revocari potest [l. si quis cum aliter]. Quod autem hic ad finem 
[par. nunc videndum] datur potestas quibusdam iudicibus restitutiones dandi, quibusdam adimitur, 
hodie non est in usu. Iure enim Codicis etiam inferioribus magistratibus hoc competit; est, quod 
Bartolus hic probat.” P Loriot, Tractatus de pactis, in De iuris apicibus tractatus octo, et de iuris arte 
tractatus viginti (1555), axiom 91, col 465. For biographical information on Coustau, see V Hayaert, 
Mens emblematica et humanisme juridique, Le cas du Pegma cum narrationibus philosophicis de 
Pierre Coustau (1555), [Travaux d’Humanisme et Renaissance, 438] (2008), 27–48. For biographi-
cal details about Loriot, see J-L Thireau, sv Loriot, Pierre, in P Arabeyre, J-L Halpérin and J Krynen 
(eds), Dictionnaire historique des juristes français, XIIe-XXe siècle (2007) 518.
36 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad l 2, part 1, cap 1, num 8, 68: “Ego verius puto doctores cum glossa 
ad verbos iurisconsulti hallucinatos fuisse, nihilque minus iurisconsultum in l. [D.45.1.36] ea 
sensisse quam de remedio huius l. [C.4.44.2] quod evincitur ex eodem Ulpiano et aliis iuriscon-
sultis in locis supra citatis, dum aperte et indistincte tradunt, laesis in precio nullatenus succurri, 
nec dolum ex sola laesione censeri.”
37 C du Moulin, Tractatus commerciorum et usurarum redituumque pecunia constitutorum et 
monetarum (1558), num 172, 152–153: “Hic Diocletiano et Maximiano ethnicis visum fuit, satis 
esse licentiam illam per excessum vel defectum a iusta et vera aequalitate declinandi ad dimid-
ium iusti pretii vel aestimationis, id est ipsius aequalitatis, cohibere, ne ulterius vagari posset. Sed 
certe haec cohibitio valde disproportionata est, utpote quae proportionem aequalitatis dimidio 
totius fraudari concedat, et sic inaequalitatem admittit duplae ad subduplam . . . quod est valde 
excessivum et a iusta aequalitate et naturali iustitia nimis remotum . . . Hinc durities dictae legis 
secundae multum placet et opportuna est viris tyrannicis et pleonecticis, qui sciunt et possunt 
sibi vigilare et cavere ne unquam decipiantur, ut numquam sibi metuant . . .”
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Emperors to have granted relief on the basis of C.4.44.2 in the first place. 
Rather than being criticised, they should be praised for their sense of equi-
ty.38 Incidentally, it might be remarked that Du Moulin is often seen as a 
forerunner of liberal commercial ethics. He nevertheless held on to the 
principles of equality in exchange and just pricing as tightly as the early 
modern scholastics.39
Another issue on which Piñel disagrees with Du Moulin concerns the 
interpretation of the famous maxim that it is naturally permitted for con-
tracting parties to try to outwit each other (D.4.4.16.4). True to his human-
istic approach, Piñel first of all rejects the medieval jurists’ interpretation 
according to which cheating in sale and lease was allowed as long as the 
quantity of the harm was moderate. In both the secular and ecclesiastical 
courts, a remedy was given to the laesus, but only if the harm was consider-
able, that is more than half of the just price (ultra dimidiam). Yet, again, this 
conventional interpretation could not satisfy Piñel’s insatiable desire for the 
truth. 
If we want to know the true meaning of D.4.4.16.4 and, by extension, 
of D.19.2.22.3, we need to free them from the intellectual world in which 
the medieval jurists lived, according to Piñel. From the classical jurists’ 
perspective, there is no difference between considerable and lesser laesio. 
Moreover, the general terms in which paragraph Idem Pomponius is phrased 
exclude any distinction between lesion beyond and lesion below moiety.40 
38 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad l 2, part 1, cap 1, num 22, 72–73: “Ex praedictis infertur contra 
Molinaeum de commerciis, num. 172 qui hanc legem duram et a tyrannis conditam exclamat, 
arguens, quod maximam iniquitatem permittat non succurrendo laesis, nisi ultra dimidiam iusti 
precii. Sed miror virum doctum | et ingeniosum inique et incaute in hanc l. invectum, debuit 
enim potius ex humanitate et aequitate eam laudare, cum antea nullum remedium laesis daba-
tur, cessante dolo vel metu vel aetatis privilegio, ut supra probavimus, vel debuit saltem cum 
omnibus agnoscere, ante hanc legem non fuisse aliam quae laesis magis succurreret, ut sic non 
magis in hanc quam in alias exclamaret.” Pinel then goes on to reprehend Du Moulin for having 
unrightfully criticised the theologians’ understanding of laesio enormis. 
39 C du Moulin, Commentarii in Parisienses consuetudines (1597) par 33, gl 1 in verb. Droict de 
relief, num 46, 438: “ . . . quando de laesione et rescissione agitur, iustum pretium ad tantam 
pecuniam aestimatur, quantum res iuste valet, non quantum repertum fuit aut reperiri posset 
. . . Et debet esse aequalitas, et eadem commensuratio inter emptorem et venditorem et eadem 
iuris summetria.”
40 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6) ad l 2, part 1, cap 1, num 32, 74–75: “Quae verba [sc. in pretio emp-
tionis et venditionis naturaliter licere contrahentibus se circumvenire] accipiunt glossa et omnes 
ibi, glossa et omnes hic, glossa et omnes in cap. cum dilectus, et noviores infra citandi, ut tantum 
referantur ad laesionem citra dimidiam. | Ego autem verissimum puto iurisconsultos in illis 
verbis indistincte de omni laesione sentire, nec aliquid referre ad mentem iurisconsultorum an 
laesio modica an maxima sit; tum ex generalitate verborum, quae non admittunt communem 
restrictionem, tum quia eo tempore incognita erat differentia magnae vel modicae laesionis, de 
qua agit haec lex, ut supra late probavimus.”
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No matter whether it is big or small, for the Romans any lesion is irrelevant 
in regard to the validity of a sale contract. In short, traditional opinion has 
been misguided by not making the effort to read the different texts from the 
Digest and the Code in their historical context. 
The new interpretation of D.4.4.16.4 suggested by Piñel rests on a read-
ing of the paragraph in its broader textual context. Title 4 of the fourth book 
of the Digest concerns minors. The lex: in causae cognitione, in particular, 
deals with the question whether a minor can be granted other remedies than 
the extraordinary remedy of restitution (restitutio in integrum).41 According 
to Piñel, the upshot of the argumentation is that minors cannot appeal to 
the special remedy of restitution unless the contract they entered into is still 
valid. Hence, the aim of paragraph Idem Pomponius is to determine whether 
cheating (circumventio) invalidates a sale contract or not. If it does, then a 
minor is granted the ordinary remedies and not restitution.
According to Piñel, what is at stake in D.4.4.16.4 is the availability of 
the remedy of restitutio in integrum for minors (principaliter agit de con-
cedenda vel neganda restitutione).42 Since cheating does not invalidate the 
contract, the conclusion to paragraph Idem Pomponius should be that a 
minor is granted the remedy of restitution in a contract where buyer and 
seller have tried to outwit each other. So D.4.4.16.4 is actually about a 
procedural advantage for minors. The purpose of the argument was not to 
establish a universal rule of law –  rigorous law –  that allows buyers and sell-
ers to outwit each other.43
Piñel disagrees with Du Moulin in interpreting the meaning of the “natu-
ral” permission to cheat. Du Moulin held that it was “naturally permitted” 
for parties to outwit each other, because they were both willing to turn a 
41 D.4.4 (De minoribus vigintiquinque annis).16pr: “In causae cognitione etiam hoc versabitur, 
num forte alia actio possit competere citra in integrum restitutionem. Nam si communi auxilio 
et mero iure munitus sit, non debet ei tribui extraordinarium auxilium, utputa cum pupillo con-
tractum est sine tutoris auctoritate, nec locupletiorem factus est.”
42 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad l 2, part 1, cap 1, num 33, 75: “Vides igitur, quod dixi contra omnes, 
quo ad mentem iurisconsulti ibi, dum principaliter agit de concedenda vel neganda restitutione, 
nullam esse differentiam inter magnam vel modicam laesionem.”
43 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad l 2, part 1, cap 1, num 34, 75: “Imo si subtilius mens iurisconsulti 
expendatur, colliges contra glossam et omnes (quod fortasse mirabile videbitur) verba illa, licere 
contrahentibus in precio se circumvenire, principaliter ibi prolata fuisse in favorem et benefi-
cium laesi, nempe minoris, ut scilicet restitutionem habere posset, quia is est scopus iuriscon-
sulti ibi. Non enim pertinebat ad rubricam nec ad ea quae iurisconsultus ibi tractabat, tradere 
regulam, vel rigorem illum iuris, ut liceat contrahentibus, in precio se circumvenire. Plane igitur 
mens iurisconsulti eiusque praecipua decisio id petit, ut non obstante qualibet laesione in precio, 
contractus valeat, et inde sequatur, minorem restituendum fore.”
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blind eye to each other’s cheating.44 Piñel rejects this analysis as unrealistic. 
After profound reflection, Piñel thinks the only correct understanding of 
“naturally” goes back to the gloss and Thomas Aquinas. Piñel insists that it 
is dangerous in this context to confound the philosophers’ notion of natural 
law and its juridical meaning. Natural law in the sense of natural equity or 
the common social bond of love between all men cannot possibly lie behind 
paragraph Idem Pomponius. In this context, the only appropriate meaning of 
“naturally” is “according to the ius gentium”. 
On account of experience, Piñel argues, people from all nations reasoned 
that lesion should be permitted (permittenda) lest commerce be continu-
ally disturbed by too strict an observance of contractual equilibrium.45 The 
security of transactions and the stability of the legal system must prevail. 
Consequently, what may be wrong on an individual basis may become per-
mitted on the level of society as a whole.46 Piñel draws inspiration from the 
views of humanists such as François Le Douaren on prescriptive acquisition 
(usucapio). A similar concern for social stability (tranquillitas reipublicae) 
allowed individuals to acquire goods in spite of their bad faith. Interestingly, 
to support this view, Manuel Soarez a Ribeira adduces Seneca’s typically 
Stoic belief that the Gods care more about the whole than about the indi-
vidual.47 Piñel himself referred to Cicero’s statement that the salvation of 
the people is the supreme law.48 In conclusion,49
44 Du Moulin, Tractatus commerciorum (n 37), num 182, 161: “Nota quod d. l. 2 non est facta, nisi 
pro veris et naturalibus contractibus commutativis, in quibus tacito quodam naturali sensu partes 
sibiipsis modicam laesionem mutuo condonare et indulgere videntur.”
45 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad l 2, part 1, cap 1, num 39, 76: “Ego aliter ea verba explicanda puta-
bam post rem vero satis consideratam, ita credo sensisse gl. In d. § idem Pomponius ad quem 
nemo advertit. Exponit enim gl. naturaliter, id est iure gentium. Intelligo autem, ut secundum 
exactissimam illam priorem aequitatem naturalem non dicatur licere contrahentibus invicem 
se in precio nec in alia re circumvenire. Nam secundum eam naturae normam omnes homines 
cognati et mutua dilectionis lege continere dicuntur . . . Exponitur ergo, naturaliter, id est iure 
gentium, quia humana ratione gentiumque et populorum iudicio compertum est, permittendam 
fuisse eam laesionem in pretio, ne ex nimia aequalitatis observatione commercia turbarentur. 
Nulla enim conventio securitatem praestaret, nunquam litium finis esset, si ob laesionem in 
pretio conventa revocarentur.”
46 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad l 2, part 1, cap 1, num 40, 77: “Unde quo ad universos et pro tran-
quilitate reipublicae potest favorabile censeri, quod singulis separatum (sic) durum videbitur.” 
47 Seneca, De divina providentia, 3, 1, in Seneca, Moral Essays, with an English translation by J W 
Basore, [Loeb Classical Library, 214], Cambridge Mass /London 19633 [=1928], vol 1, 14: “. . . 
pro universis, quorum maior diis cura quam singulorum est . . .”.
48 Cicero, De legibus, 3, 3, 8, in Cicéron, Traité des lois, Texte établi et traduit par G de Plinval, 
[Collection des Universités de France], (19682)[=1959], 85: “Salus populi suprema lex esto.”
49 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad l 2, part. 1, cap 1, num 40, 77: “Naturaliter igitur licere dixerunt 
iurisconsulti ex permissione humani iuris seu gentium, secundum quod ad quietem reipublicae 
magis consentaneum visum est, eam laesionem in precio remittere, et ideo ea non obstante, 
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The jurists used the expression “naturally allowed” by reason of a permission by 
human law, i.e. the law of nations, to the extent that it is more conducive to the 
stability of the republic to condone lesion in the price. As a result, the contract 
remains valid regardless of the lesion, so that then, in particular, it became neces-
sary to grant restitution as a remedy to minors. That is what Pomponius’ fragment 
is all about.
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The humanist flavour of Arias Piñel’s legal thought expressed itself through 
his constant emphasis upon the difference between the original sense of the 
Roman texts and the meaning that was read into them in subsequent ages. 
The outrage which Piñel felt at the abuse of the Digest translated itself into 
scathing remarks about the historical nonsense of the medieval jurists, which 
sometimes persisted even in contemporary humanist jurisprudence. His 
philological nature made Piñel fundamentally unhappy with the anachronis-
tic use of Roman legal texts. However, one should not infer from this that 
Piñel did not share the scholastic jurists’ commitment to adapt legal thinking 
to the needs of their own, essentially Christian society. Also, his slightly con-
descending attitude towards the medieval ius commune did not prevent him 
from citing scholastic authorities such as Thomas Aquinas and Baldus along 
with the great classical poets and philosophers from Antiquity. 
Ironically, Piñel could be considered as a humanist jurist who took the 
Christian heritage from the middle ages more seriously than his scholastic 
counterparts. For example, his treatment of the renunciability of the remedy 
grounded on the Lex secunda was deeply influenced by the Christian con-
cern to protect the weak and to promote equity (aequitas). While the medie-
val jurists had recognised that contracting parties had a right to renounce the 
remedy by virtue of C.4.44.2, Piñel was highly critical of all of those renun-
ciation clauses. Perhaps he was influenced here by the work of Antonio 
Gómez, a professor of Roman law at the University of Salamanca. Gómez 
had argued that even the combination of a specific renunciation clause and a 
donation clause could not deprive the laesus of his right to seek support from 
the Lex secunda. He reasoned that the same facility (facilitas) with which 
such a party could become the victim of lesion would be at the basis of his 
renunciation or donation clause.50 Piñel took this reasoning a step further. 
semper contractus valet, et consequenter restitutio tunc specialiter minoribus necessaria fuit, ad 
id enim tendit iurisconsultus in d. § ut supra.”
50 A Gómez, Commentarii variaeque resolutions (1572), tom 2, cap 2, num 26, 227: “Item adde, 
quod talis deceptus poterit agere remedio praedictae legis secundae, etiamsi dixerit, quod donat 
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According to him, even if the lesioned party knew in advance that he was 
going to suffer lesion, this knowledge did not deprive him of the remedy 
provided by C. 4,44,2. Contrary to the common, medieval opinion, Piñel 
argued that knowledge does not take away that remedy.
One of the main motivations behind Piñel’s attack on the communis opinio 
lay not in his general criticism of the medieval legal tradition, but rather in 
his loyalty to Christian morality.51 “The contrary opinion is more true and 
more decent to Christians.”52 Christian morality urges Piñel to take the 
possibility of abuse of necessity (necessitas) seriously. Knowledge of the true 
price should not be a ground to relinquish the remedy offered by C.4.44.2, 
because equity (aequitas) lies at the very heart of this constitution.53 Typical 
of his practical approach to the interpretation of ancient texts, Piñel also 
hailed the procedural advantages of this view. In court, the burden of proof 
now shifted from the laesus to the laedens. The victim of laesio enormis 
would no longer need to maintain his ignorance, let alone prove it.54 In 
other words, Arias Piñel was a jurist with a taste for philological criticism 
and humanist erudition, but he also showed himself to be sensible to the 
needs of legal practice, certainly in a Christian society. Conscience requires 
that equity and good faith be observed down to the last detail.55 In case of 
conflict, even Piñel’s profoundly humanist sense of the pure letter of Roman 
law must bend before the spirit of equity. 
illud quod plus valeret et insuper renunciavit remedio praedictae legis secundae, quia illa verba 
non debent referri ad magnum pretium, sed ad modicum . . . Item etiam, quia eadem facilitate 
qua inducitur ad vendendum, inducitur etiam ad ponendum illam clausulam vel aliam similem 
. . . ”
51 For a more profound discussion, see Decock, Theologians and contract law (n 1) 581–588.
52 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad l 2, part 1, cap 2, num 11, 80: “Sed ea scribentium turba nos non 
deterruit, quin contrarium verius, et Christianis hominibus decentius putemus.”
53 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6) ad l 2, part 1, cap 2, num 12, 81: “Suadetur etiam ex aequitate, qua 
lex haec principaliter nititur, quae militat etiam in eo, qui sciebat verum pretium, potuitque ex 
necessitate vel alia causa moveri. Iuvatur etiam, quia iura saepe succurrunt hominibus dissipan-
tibus bona sua.”
54 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad l 2, part 1, cap 2, num 16, 81–82: “Infertur similiter necessario, ad 
praxim et libellum in materia huius legis non esse necessarium articulos vel positiones formare, 
quod laesio per ignorantiam contigerit . . . Ex quo etiam resultat non solum in processu non 
oportere probare ignorantiam . . . sed nec eam allegare . . . ”
55 Piñel, Commentarii (n 6), ad l 2, part 1, cap 1, num 35, 75: “Quae receptior et magis pia traditio 
satis comprabatur ex iurisconsulto in d. l. iure succursum, 7, § finali, ff. de iure dotali iuncta 
declaratione superius tradita. Ubi enim exactissime bona fides et aequitas requiritur, prout ibi in 
causa dotis etiam minor laesio emendari iubetur, quod magis viget in foro conscientiae.”
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